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REGULATION OF RAILROAD HOLDING
COMPANIES UNDER THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT: THE ALLEGHANY CASE
T HE MAINTENANCE of any workable system of administrative
regulation requires a careful allocation of responsibility among
the various administrative bodies.' When, however, the activities of a
particular company become significant in more than one economic
sphere, there arises the possibility of an overlap in the regulatory juris-
diction of two or more agencies. In these circumstances, it is quite
possible that dual regulation will be considered impracticable, despite
the fact that each agency may assert a discrete, but nonetheless vital,
interest in the regulation of that company's activities. Such an impasse
appears to have materialized with the recent acquisition of the control
of the New York Central R.R. Co. by the Alleghany Corporation.'
The Interstate Commerce Commission, 3 on the one hand, is charged
with the duty of supervising railroad holding companies in two re-
spects: First, in order to assure the unification of the country's railway
systems in the manner most consistent with the public interest, section
5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act4 provides that acquisitions of the
1 See LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30 (1938), where a distinction is
observed between "administrative bodies whose essential concern is the economic func-
tioning of the particular industry and those which have an extended police function
of a particular nature." Presumably, the Interstate Commerce Commission would fall
into the former category; whereas the Securities and Exchange Commission, in its
regulation of securities issuances generally, would fall into the latter, and, in its
regulation of public utility holding companies into the former.
'The annual stockholders' meeting of the New York Central R.R. Co., scheduled
for May z6, 1954, was preceded by a much publicized proxy contest between the
Central management and the insurgent Alleghany group under the leadership of Robert
R. Young. On June ii, after two adjournments of the meeting, it was announced
that the Young interests had acquired control by a 1,o6z,ooo vote margin. N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1954, p. x, col. 8. See id. at p. 27, cols. 5-8, for a chronology of the
proxy fight and subsequent proceedings. See also, How Young Got the Votes, Fortune,
Aug. 1954, p. 87.
'Hereinafter referred to as the I(fC.
'48 STAT. 217 (1933), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (195Z).
"(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as
provided in subdivision (b) of this section . . . (i) . . . for a person which is not a
carrier to acquire control of two or more carriers through ownership of their stock or
otherwise; or for a person which is not d carrier and which has control of one or
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control of carriers by noncarriers must be approved by the ICC. And,
in addition, section 5(3) of the act gives the ICC the power to exercise
a continuing regulation over the financial practices of noncarriers that
acquire control of carriers.5 It is in this latter respect that regulation
by the ICC comes into conflict with the regulatory scheme of the In-
vestment Company Act of I94o,6 administered by the Securities and
more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock
or otherwise....
"(b) . .. If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such
modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within
the scope of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph and will be consistent with the public
interest, it shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the
terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reason-
able. .... .
The enactment of these provisions in 1933 was precipitated, at first, by the Com-
mission's fear that orderly unification of the nation's railroads might be frustrated by
the activities of holding companies. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 79-83 (1929). The Commission had already determined that its jurisdic-
tion, under the 192o legislation, to supervise consolidations among carriers was not
broad enough to permit it to regulate the acquisitions of control of noncarriers. Stock
of Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 70 I.C.C. 1o (921). In response to the
Commission's recommendation, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce undertook to investigate the situation. The product of the investigation was a
three volume report, Regulation of Stock O'wnership in Railroads, H.R. REP. No.
2789, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (931), which bore'out the Commission's fear and recom-
mended an amendment to the act to subject noncarrier acquisitions of control to the
Commission's jurisdiction. For a good general discussion of the legislative background
of the present § 5(7), see 3 A SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
430-42 (1935). For a more technical discussion of the functions of the holding com-
pany in effecting railroad consolidations, and of the need for regulation, see BON-
3RIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY 223-318 (1932).
548 STAT. 217 (1933), as amended, 4.9 U.S.C. § 5(3) (1952). This section pro-
vides that whenever a noncarrier is authorized under § 5(z) to acquire control of a
carrier, then it "shall, to the extent provided by the Commission in such order, be con-
sidered as a carrier subject to any of the following provisions ...: Sections zo(i)-
(1o), 304(a) (i) and (z), 32o and 9x3 of this title (which relate to reports, accounts
and so forth, of carriers), and sections zoa(z)-(ss), and 314 of this title (which
relate to issues of securities and assumptions of liability of carriers). . .. " The report
provisions are clearly ancillary to the provisions authorizing the regulation of securi-
ties issuances. Consequently, it seems that they should be made applicable only if se-
curities issuance regulation is considered necessary. Cf. Memorandum of the SEC as
Intervenor, pp. zo-zs, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc.,
295 I.C.C. 1 (1955)-
054 STAT. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§Soa-s to 8oa-5z (1952). The
enactment of this statute followed an intensive study of the investment company in-
dustry conducted by the SEC pursuant to §30 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935. 49 STAT. 837 (1935), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §79z-4 (1952). The
report of the SEC was submitted to Congress in five parts from June bo, 1938 to June
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Exchange Commission.' This stems from the fact that a corporation
like Alleghany, while operating as an investment company,8 may, in the
course of its normal investment activities, acquire the status of a railroad
holding companyf In such a situation, if the ICC properly asserts its
section 5(3) power to supervise corporate financing, then the corpora-
tion will be entitled to a total exemption under section 3(c) (9) of the
Investment Company Act, which excludes from the provisions of that
act "any company subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce
Act."' 0
This statutory exclusion dearly forecloses any dual regulation by
the ICC and SEC. Nevertheless, the essentially dual nature' of the
9, x941. In addition, six supplemental reports were submitted during that period.
This material will hereinafter be cited as SEC REPORT.
For discussion of the statute, see: Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940,
26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941)5 Thomas, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 98 (94x) ; Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26
CORNELL L.Q. 77 (194o) 5 Comment, So YALE L.J. 440 (t94I); Note 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (i941). See also Barnard, Motley & Jackson, Federal Regulation of In-
vestment Companies Since 194o, 63 HARV. L. REV. T134 (1950)5 Note, 88 U.
PA. L. REv. 584 (1940).
H. R. REP. NO. 2639, 7 6th Cong., 3 d Sess. (594o), contains a section by section
summary of the act; and S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. (1940), contains a
topical summary.
' Hereinafter referred to as the SEC.
'See note 46 infra.
' The Alleghany Corporation registered with the SEC as a nondiversified investment
company on November i, 194o, at which time 95% of its investments were in railroads
and allied securities, including an investment of $8o,ooo,ooo in the C. & 0. Ry. Co.
When the C. & 0. Ry. Co. acquired control of another carrier, the ICC entered an
order, pursuant to § 5(), subjecting Alleghany to its continuing regulation under
§ 2oa. See note 15 infra.
0 54 STAT. 797 (-940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-3(c)(9) (1952). The section excludes
from the definition of an investment company ". . . any company subject to regulation
under the Interstate Commerce Act, or any company whose entire outstanding capital
stock is owned or controlled by such a company: Provided, That the assets of the con-
trolled company consist substantially of securities issued by companies which are subject
to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act." The legislative history of this
section is discussed in note 86 infra.
A registered investment company which becomes subject to ICC regulation is en-
titled to an order by the SEC, under § 8(f) of the Investment Company Act, terminating
its registration statement. 54 STAT. 803 (1940), 15 U.S.C. Soa-8(f) (195±). Conse-
quently, Alleghany's registration statement was terminated by the SEC after the ICC
order of June 5, 1945. Alleghany Corporation, 2o S.E.C. 731 (1945). See also,
The Atlantic Coast Line Co., 9 S.E.C. 68o (1941); ii S.E.C. 661 (1942).
' "The major problem in defining an investment company lay in drawing the line
between an investment company and a holding company." Jaretzki, supra note 6, at
312. Because of this difficulty of classifying certain hybrid forms, the SEC REPORT
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Alleghany Corporation suggests that the conflict should not be resolved
in such a categorical manner. Instead, perhaps there is a need for a
more delicate coordination between the two commissions in this area.
To this end, an examination of the current controversy over the status
of Alleghany should prove helpful.
.THE ALLEGHANY CONTROVERSY
In May 1954, after an extended proxy contest,"2 the Alleghany
Corporation and its officers acquired effective control of the New York
Central R.R. Co. They did so, however, without obtaining the approval
of the ICC.13  Several months later, Alleghany and New York Central
filed with the ICC an application, pursuant to sections 5(2) and 5(3)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, for an order approving the merger of
recognized that there were "management investment-holding companies" which exer-
cised a dual function. SEC REPORT pt. i, c. I, at i; pt. II, c. II, at 88-94; Pt. 4, c. I
(dealing extensively with the "quasi-holding company"). In dealing with this prob-
lem, § 3 (a) of the statute defines an "investment company" as any issuer which "is or
holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities," or which owns investment
securities having a value exceeding 40% of the value of such issuer's total assets. In
order to insure the exclusion of pure holding companies, § 3 (b) (2) of the act gives the
SEC the power to find that a company is "primarily engaged in a business or businesses
other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities . . .
through majority owned subsidiaries or through controlled companies conducting similar
types of business.' 54 STAT. 797 (1940), l5 U.S.C. §8oa-3 (1952). In applying this
test, the SEC has said that, "The principal relevant considerations are 1) the com-
pany's historical development5 2) its public representations of policy; 3) the activities
of its officers and directors; and, most important, 4) the nature of its present assets,
and 5) the sources of its present income." Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada, 26 S.E.C.
426, 427 (947).
2 See note 2 supra. During the course of this proxy contest, the Alleghany man-
agement announced a plan to use the sales force of Investors Diversified Services, Inc.
(IDS), an affiliated investment company, for the solicitation of proxies. This plan
was abandoned after a suggestion by the SEC that it might involve a violation of the
Investment Company Act by the officers, directors, and controlling stockholders of
IDS. Memorandum of the SEC as Intervenor, p. 6, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge
and Railroad Co. Merger, etc., 295 I.C.C. i (1955).
"' On April 6, 1954, a proceeding was instituted by the New York Central manage-
ment which sought to obtain a declaratory ruling by the ICC that the proposed ac-
quisition of Central by Alleghany would be in violation of § 5 (4) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, unless ICC approval was obtained. Alleghany argued, in response,
that any such declaratory order would interfere with the stockholders' right to select its
own management. On May l8, 1954, the Commission denied Central's petition on the
grounds that "to do otherwise would not advance justice." The proceeding is discussed
in I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4 (955).
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two subsidiaries of New York Central, 4 and an order designating Alle-
ghany as a noncarrier to be "considered as a carrier" subject to regula-
tion by the ICC.'5 The SEC was permitted to intervene in this pro-
ceeding for the limited purpose of submitting memoranda'0 requesting
the ICC, in its discretion, not to assert its jurisdiction, but to defer to the
SEC because Alleghany was still operating preponderantly as an in-
vestment company. Despite this. request, both orders were granted
"In fact, the two merging subsidiaries also joined in the application. The pro-
posal was to merge the properties of the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad
Co. into the properties of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway
Company, hereinafter referred to as the Big Four, for ownership, management, and
operation; and, also, for modification of a lease pursuant to which New York Central,
as lessee, operates the property of the Big Four. At the time of the application, New
York Central owned 98.98% of the common, and 86.45% of the outstanding pre-
ferred stock of the Big Four; and, in turn, the Big Four owned the entire capital stock
of the Jeffersonville Co. It was stated in the application that Alleghany, with New
York Central, indirectly controlled Jeffersonville through the Big Four. Presumably,
the theory of the application was, that by virtue of the merger, Alleghany's control
of the properties of Jeffersonville would now be more direct. Louisville & Jefferson-
ville Bridge and Railroad Company Merger, etc., I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 18656,
Report of Division 4. ('955).
" More specifically, the application, as it pertained to Alleghany, requested "con-
tinuation of Alleghany's status as a carrier" rather than a new order designating Alle-
ghany as a carrier. The basis for the implication that Alleghany already was "con-
sidered as a carrier" at the time of the application lies in the terms of an ICC order
issued June 5, 1945, in a proceeding involving Alleghany's "acquisition," through its
control of the C. & 0. Ry. Co., of the properties of the Norfolk Terminal & Trans-
portation Co. At that proceeding, the ICC provided in its order that Alleghany shall be
considered as a carrier "unless and until otherwise ordered by this Commission." C. &
0. Ry. Co., Purchase, z6i I.C.C. 239, z61 (945). Shortly thereafter, the SEC
entered its order, pursuant to § 8(f) of the Investment Company Act, which stated that
if ICC regulation should cease, the SEC registration would be reinstated after appro-
priate notice and hearing. Alleghany Corporation, zo S.E.C. 731 (945). See note
io supra. Accordingly, even though on Jan. 19, 1954, Alleghany had divested itself
of ownership of its C. & 0. stock, it took the position in the federal district court pro-
ceeding on the preliminary injunction, that the minority stockholders were not prejudiced
if the later ICC orders were invalid, because Alleghany had acquired "carrier" status
in the C. & 0. proceeding in 1945. It was argued that the 1945 order was still valid
since the ICC had not "otherwise ordered." In addition, it was urged that the SEC
exemption was still operative, since no further hearing had been held. These con-
tentions were rejected both in the first district court opinion on the preliminary in-
junction, Breswick v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 13z, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and in
the final district court opinion invalidating the ICC orders. 138 F. Supp. 123, 128-130
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). This issue is one of the questions presented on appeal to the Supreme
Court. Appellants Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 6, Alleghany Corp v. Breswick &
Co., appeal granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. April 24, 1956) (No. 69z).
"'The SEC submitted a memorandum dated Sept. 14, 1954, and supplemental
memoranda dated Sept. 28, 1954, and Dec. 14, 1954.
19561
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by the ICC.17  Accordingly, when Alleghany later planned the issuance
of a new class of preferred stock pursuant to a voluntary exchange offer,
it sought the approval of the ICC.'8 The issuance was approvedi"'
but before it could be consummated, distribution of the stock was sus-
pended by a temporary restraining order obtained by minority stock-
holders of Alleghany," who, objecting to the company's immunity from
regulation under the Investment Company Act, had attacked the juris-
diction of the ICC.2' Thereafter, a three-judge district court issued a
7 Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Company Merger, etc., I.C.C.
Finance Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4, aff'd., z95 I.C.C. ix (955).
"By application filed Feb. is, 1955, Alleghany sought the authorization of the
ICC under § 2oa of the Interstate Commerce Act, to issue 1,367,440 shares of 6% con-
vertible preferred stock in exchange for its outstanding cumulative 5y2% preferred
stock, and to issue 14,768,352 shares of common stock upon conversion of the 6%
preferred. The proposed exchange had been approved at a special meeting of Alle-
ghany stockholders on Feb. 8, 1955i and, on the same day, appropriate amendments to
the certificate of incorporation had been filed with the state officials. In the ICC pro-
ceeding, certain minority stockholders were permitted to intervene, and contended that
the convertible feature of the new preferred stock would so substantially dilute the
equity of the existing stockholders as to make the plan unfair. The Commission,
through its Division 4, rejected this contention and concluded that the issue was ap-
propriate by the standards of § 2oa. Alleghany Corporation Stock, Finance Docket
No. 18866, Report of Division 4 (x955).
19 On May 26, 1955, the full Commission adopted the report of Division 4, and
formally authorized the issuance of the stock. Alleghany Corporation Stock, Finance
Docket No. 18866 (i955).
2 The temporary restraining order, although not reported officially, was issued on
June z3, 2955, at 6:30 P. M., ex parte, and restrained Alleghany, its tranfer agent,
and the exchange agent, from further distributing, issuing or transferring the 6%
preferred stock. By that time, 9oo,ooo of the 1,300,000 shares had already been
delivered to the shareholders who were participating in the exchange. Appellant's
Statement as to Jurisdiction, Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., appeal granted, 24
U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. April 24, 2956) (No. 692).
" In addition, essentially the same minority stockholders, as plaintiffs, had brought
a stockholders' derivative action to recover for the directors' alleged conspiracy to use
the corporation's facilities for their own personal gain. In Sept. 1955, the plaintiffs
moved for a summary judgment as to five of their seven courts. Plaintiffs also moved
for a stay of settlement proceedings by other minority stockholders in the New York
State Supreme Court. Defendants moved to consolidate this action with other deriva-
tive actions already consolidated and for the designation of a general counsel for alt
the consolidated actions. In an order by Judge Walsh, on Sept. 28, 1955, the plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment was denied in full. The court refused to stay
the settlement proceedings in the state court, but enjoined the defendants from using
any state court judgment as a defense against these plaintiffs. The court also denied
the defendant's motion to consolidate. Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, x35 F. Supp. 397.
(S.D.N.Y. I955.)
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preliminary injunction continuing the restraining order;22 and, eventu-
ally, the same court entered a final judgment23 invalidating both the
ICC order asserting jurisdiction over Alleghany and the order approving
the issuance of the new preferred stock. Appeals by Alleghany and
the ICC24 are now pending before the Supreme Court.25
The more important of the questions raised by the litigation are:
first, whether issuance of the section 5() order asserting jurisdiction
over the Alleghany Corporation was within the power of the ICCi and
second, if so, whether the ICC should surrender its jurisdiction to the
SEC.20
2 2Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Circuit
Judge Hincks dissented, primarily on the ground that the plaintiffs had not adequately
demonstrated that they would be irreparably damaged in the absence of injunctive relief.
He argued that the plaintiff's assertion of irreparable damage depended entirely on a
showing that the terms of the preferred stock issue were such that it would be dis-
approved by the SEC if Alleghany were subjected to its jurisdiction under the Invest-
ment Company Act. No such showing, in his opinion, had been made. By inad-
vertence, Judge Hincks' opinion was not reported with the majority opinion in 134
F. Supp. 132. It is set out in Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction, Alleghany
Corp. v. Breswick & Co., appeal granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. April 24,
1956) (No. 692).
"Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), noted in 69
HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2956). Prior to this proceeding, but subsequent to the proceeding
for the preliminary injunction, Alleghany made application to Justice Harlan, as a
circuit judge, for an order staying the district court's preliminary injunction pending
appeal to the Supreme Court. After carefully evaluating the possibilities of prejudice
to the plaintiffs and to Alleghany's other stockholders, Justice Harlan granted the
stay as to the 900,000 shares of preferred stock already distributed. The stay was
conditioned, however, on Alleghany's posting a $24,00o bond indemnifying the plain-
tiffs against any loss which might result from the dilution of their equity as common
stockholders by the exercise of the conversion privilege in the 6% preferred. Not-
withstanding the stay order, trading in the entire issue of the 6% preferred remained
suspended on the New York Stock Exchange5 and the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers admonished its member firms against trading in the issue. For all practical
purposes, then, the stay was of no value. Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction,
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., appeal granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S.
April 24, 1956) (No. 692).
2' Notice of Appeal by the Interstate Commerce Commission to the Supreme Court
of the United States, Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), filed March 23, 1956. The United States has not appealed.
Appeal granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. April 24, 1956) (No. 692).
"Other questions raised by the appeal concern the standing of the minority share-
holders to seek review of the ICC orders, and the propriety of the ICC's failure to
grant plaintiffs a hearing. Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction, Alleghany Corp.
v. Breswick & Co., appeal granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3277 (U.S. April 24, 1956) (No.
692).
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Vaidity of the ICC Order:
It is dear that the ICC may subject a noncarrier to its continuing
supervision by an order under section 5(3) only when there is an
accompanying order under section 5(2) approving an "acquisition of
control" by the noncarrier."7 In its attempt to come within the ICC
jurisdiction under section 5(3), Alleghany proceeded somewhat in-
directly, applying not for approval of its control relationship with New
York Central, but rather for approval of a merger of two New York
Central subsidiaries.28  The Commission, relying on past decisions
indicating that such an intercorporate re-arrangement could be an "ac-
quisition of control" within the meaning of the statute, 2  approved the
merger, and, on that basis, designated Alleghany as a "carrier" for pur-
poses of ICC supervision.30  The district court, however, in nullifying
the ICC orders, disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of the
statute and held that an intercorporate re-arrangement could not consti-
tute an acquisition of control.3 ' Therefore, the court concluded, the
Commission could not assert general jurisdiction over Alleghany without
first approving its control of New York Central.82
2' See note 5 supra.
28 See note 14 supra.
29 See, for example, Nicholas, Fayette & Greenbrier R.R. Co. Lease, 261 I.C.C.
546 (945) ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. Purchase, 761 I.C.C. 239 (t945); Saginaw
Dock & Terminal Co.-Contract Carrier Application, 26o I.C.C. 657 (1945); War-
rior & Gulf Nay. Co. Control, 250 I.C.C. 26 (1941) ; United Parcel Service of Port-
land-Purchase-Wiese, 37 M.C.C. 473 (x94x); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.-Con-
trol-Santa Fe Trail Trans., 15 M.C.C. 469 (1938).
0 Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, Etc., 295 I.C.C. 11
('955).
3' Understandably, the district court in both proceedings opposed the proposition
that the statutory requirement of acquisition of control could be met by a merger of
two subsidiaries which already were controlled by Alleghany. In its opinion in the
preliminary injunction proceeding, the court was emphatic in its rejection of the
Commission's interpretation of the statute. 134 F. Supp. 132, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
In the proceeding for the final injunction, the court pointed out that if the Com-
mission had been consistent in its interpretation of § 5(), the court might be disposed
to give its construction greater deference. However, the court was of the opinion that
the ICC had not been consistent in its application of the statute to intercorporate re-
arrangements. 138 F. Supp. 123, 1z8 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
"2 The first opinion of the district court raises an interesting collateral issue which
may have considerable significance in any subsequent proceedings. The court took the
position that even though Alleghany sought carrier status by virtue of the merger of
the Central subsidiaries, nevertheless, implicit in its application was the assertion
that it controlled Central. Accordingly, the court felt that the ICC could have made
appropriate findings as to Alleghany's control of Central in the merger proceeding. 134
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It would appear that the district court was correct only in its con-
clusion. There is substantial basis for the ICC's less restrictive interpre-
tation of "acquisition of control" ; 3 and it is likely that the court's rea-
soning on this point was unnecessarily influenced by its conviction that the
ICC should not regulate Alleghany under section 5(3) without first
approving its control of New York Central. 34 This conclusion, however,
F. Supp. 132, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court then went on to explore the possi-
bility that the ICC had, by implication, made adequate findings in its opinions dealing
with the merger. After first concluding that the ICC had not found that Alleghany's
control of Central was in the public interest, the court then examined the Com-
mission's conclusion on the issue of control alone. The court adverted to language
in the opinion by the ICC's Division 4, and by the full Commission, to the effect that
it was not Alleghany alone that controlled New York Central, but rather "Alleghany
and its officers" or "Alleghany and its allied interests." Consequently, the court sug-
gested that Alleghany might not control Central within the meaning of § 5(2), since
its interpretation of that section would indicate that sole control is required. x34 F.
Supp. 132, 146-147 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
It is unlikely that the court's concern on this point is well-founded. In the only
Supreme Court opinion dealing with § 5(2), the Court pointed out that the statute
defined "control" to include "actual as well as legal control . . . through or by com-
mon directors, officers, or stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a holding or investment
company or companies, or through or by any other direct or indirect means ... "
United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U.S. 31, 38 (944). Alleghany's con-
trol over New York Central, despite the cooperative interests of its officers, would
certainly come within this language.
"The ICC's interpretation is simply intended to require a noncarrier to obtain
the Commission's approval whenever a railroad company, whose ultimate parent is
controlled by the noncarrier, is reorganized in a manner which results in the non-
carrier's control over the company being less indirect. Nicholas, Fayette & Greenbrier
R.R. Co. Lease, 261 I.C.C. 546 (1945). Thus, in the instant proceeding, as a result
of the merger between Jeffersonville and the Big Four, Alleghany's control of Jeffer-
sonville, through New York Central, would be asset control rather than stock control.
Since the definition of "controP in the Interstate Commerce Act is extremely broad
[see the opinion in United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U.S. 31, 38 (1944)],
there would be no difficulty in designating such a reorganization an "acquisition of
control" by Alleghany. In addition, since § 5(2) clearly requires the ICC's approval
of the merger, it would hardly be unreasonable if the noncarrier were" required to be
a party to the proceeding. In fact, the only conceivable objection to the ICC's inter-
pretation of § 5(2), is the erroneous notion, both of the district court and of the ICC,
that such an "acquisition of control" can support a § 5(3) order. It seems fairly
certain that this would be improper. See text to note 35 infra. And, accordingly,
there appears to be little justification for the district court's rejection of the Com-
mission's interpretation of § 5(2). But see 69 HARV. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1956).
a' The ICC seemed to justify its failure to approve the acquisition of the control
of New York Central on two grounds: first, that Central is a "system" rather than
a "carrieri" and, second, that this was not really an "acquisition of control," but
merely a change in the board of directors. Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Rail-
road Co. Merger, etc., 295 I.C.C. 11, 15-17 (1955). Both of these arguments had
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could have been reached more directly. Even adopting the Commis-
sion's interpretation of the statute, the merger of the New York Central
subsidiaries could not establish or solidify Alleghany's control over
either of them unless it was presumed that Alleghany controlled New
York Central. Such unapproved control, however, is prohibited by the
Interstate Commerce Act.3 Accordingly, the district court could easily
have refused to recognize Alleghany's status as a "carrier" regulated by
the ICC, since that status was entirely dependent on an unlawful
control relationship.
In sum, it seems clear that the ICC's jurisdiction-assuming order
was invalid. But that invalidity may easily be corrected by appropriate
findings as to Alleghany's control relationship with New York Central.
THE REGULATORY INTERESTS OF THE Two COMMISSIONS
Assuming, then, that the ICC could have the power to issue the
section 5(3) order, there remains the broader question of whether this
assumption of jurisdiction would best serve the interests of the public.
This problem must be resolved by an evaluation of the respective pur-
poses sought to be promoted by ICC and SEC regulation.3
ICC Regulatory Interests:
Both the ICC and the majority stockholders of the Alleghany
Corporation assert generally that Alleghany should be considered as a
carrier under section 5(3) because "its influence on the national trans-
portation system ... is immediate in effect and wide in scope."37  When
analyzed in more specific terms, however, this influence appears some-
what less formidable. It is quite true that the Alleghany manage-
been rejected by the Division 4 report, which, nevertheless, had concluded that approval
of the control of Central was unnecessary. I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 18656, Report
of Division 4, Sheets 9 & 16 (1955).
3548 STAT. ziS (933), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §5(4) (1952). "It shall be
unlawful for any person, except as provided in paragraph (z) of this section, to enter
into any transaction within the scope of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of this
section, or to accomplish or effectuate ...the control or management in a common
interest of two or more carriers, however such result is attained. . . " Curiously, the
ICC made no reference to this section in their opinions.
" In the proceeding on the preliminary injunction, the district court adverted to
the problem of whether the ICC, assuming it had jurisdiction to submit Alleghany to
its regulation, should have deferred its regulation in favor of the SEC; but the point
was not discussed. t34 F. Supp. 132, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"T Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge & Railroad Co. Merger, etc., I.C.C. Finance
Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4, Sheet x6 (-955).
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ment "is now operating under a policy of simplifying Central's corporate
organization, and from time to time will apply for authority to change
the internal structure thereof by merger, consolidations, leases, and/or
other acquisitions of property. 38  But it is also true that the ICC can
adequately supervise this simplification by exercising its section 5(2)
power to approve or disapprove the various corporate changes as they
are proposed. Consequently, it seems that this particular aspect of
Alleghany's influence on the national transportation system does not
necessitate a continuing regulation by the IC.C under section 5(3).39
Such continuing regulation is more convincingly urged on the ground
that the ICC is vitally concerned with the "corporate structure and
financial practices of companies which control subsidiary carrier com-
panies."140  This concern, however, seems to be largely limited to the
prevention of capital inflation and top-heavy senior securities. 4' These
deficiencies in the capital structure of a holding company may, of course,
have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the operating companies.42
"8 Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc., I.C.C. Finance
Docket No. i8656, Report of Division 4, Sheet 5 (1955). This reference to the
policies of the Alleghany management was made in the course of the opinion of Di-
vision 4 approving the merger application submitted by Alleghany and the New York
Central. See also, Planning to Remake the Central, Business Week, June 12, 1954, p.
27. Also, in this connection, it has been said that Robert R. Young first came into
railroad proninence in 1947, advertising: "A Hog Can Cross the Country Without
Changing Trains, But You Can't." N.Y. Times, June 12, 1954, p. 27, col. i.
"The continuing regulation authorized by § 5(3) is primarily the regulation of
"issues of securities and assumptions of liability" under § 2oa. See note 5 supra. With
respect to § 2oa, § 5(3) provides that "the Commission shall authorize the issue or as-
sumption applied for only if it finds that such issue or assumption is consistent with the
proper performance of its service to the public by each carrier which is under the control
of such person, that it will not impair the ability of any such carrier to perform such
service, and that it is otherwise consistent with the public interest."
40 Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc., I.C.C. Finance
Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4, Sheet 13 (955).
41 For an extensive examination of ICC regulation under § 2oa, see LOCKLIN,
REGULATION OF SECURITY ISSUES BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1925).
See also 3 -A SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 502-54. The prevention of over-
capitalization, however, is not the sole concern of the ICC under § 2oa. For example,
under its broad grant of authority, the ICC has, with certain exceptions, required the
use of competitive bidding in the sale of rail securities. See In re Competitive Bidding
in Sale of Securities, 257 I.C.C. 129 (1944)5 49 C.F.R. § 56.25 (Supp. 3956). In
addition, the ICC has been concerned with maintaining a proper relationship between
capital investment and corporate control. See note 58 infra.
" See BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 308-10 (1932). A similar
problem arises in connection with public utility holding companies. Cf. id. at 158-74;
GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 54-9-50 (948).
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For example, any type of financially unsound capitalization could well
encourage a controlling corporation to accelerate the dividend payments
of the operating carrier, which, in turn, might jeopardize the financial
condition of the latter and discourage the reduction of traffic rates. 43 In
addition, it has been suggested that the unfavorable financial condition
of a holding company will reflect on the credit of the operating sub-
sidiary, thus limiting its sources of new capital.44 Nevertheless, it must
at least be recognized that these adverse effects are somewhat attenu-
ated 45 when, as in the case of Alleghany, the controlling corporation is
primarily an investment company, the portfolio of which is largely com-
posed of noncarrier securities.46
" Commissioner Eastman of the ICC, testifying before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on April 5, 9, and 1o, 193o, expressed the opinion
that "when capitalization [of railroad holding companies] is inflated, every possible
effort will be made to secure the excessive earnings which are necessary to support
it. . . . Overcapitalization also invites attempts to drain off profits surreptitiously in
various indirect ways. . . .1 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Regulation of Stock Ownership in Railroads, H. R. REP. No. 2789, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.
x (s93).
"BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 167-70 (1932). Also, Com-
missioner Eastman testified that "an inflated capitalization in the long run means poor
credit. . . . H. R. REP. No. 2789, op. cit. supra note 43, at x.
"See, e.g., BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 295. Cf. id. at
168-69, with primary reference to public utility holding companies: "For, while it is
true that a financially weak holding company will almost inevitably impair the capital-
raising powers of its operating subsidiaries, it is also true that there is a certain degree
of independence between the credit of the parent company and the credit of its sub-
sidiaries."
"6In its original memorandum, the SEC indicated that only 16% of Alleghany's
$67,000,000 portfolio was invested in railroad stock. Memorandum of the SEC as
Intervenor, pp. 4-7, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc. ±95
I.C.C. 1s (1955). In its reply, filed October 14, 1954, Alleghany pointed to the
acquisition of additional shares of Central stock and of other rail securities, and esti-
mated its present investments in railroad securities at 5z% of its portfolio. In addi-
tion, it represented to the ICC that it intended to divest itself of is non-rail securities
as soon as practicable, and expected that its portfolio would eventually consist of not
less than 75% in railroad securities. Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad
Company Merger, Finance Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4, Sheet 13. Re-
sponding to Alleghany's reply by a supplemental memorandum, the SEC adhered to
the figures on Alleghany's investments given in its prior memorandum. "Alleghany's
substantially different figures (Reply p. to), apart from minor portfolio changes since
July, 1954, are based on cost rather than present worth valuations (Reply p. 5). The
SEC believes that any here meaningful analysis of Alleghany's investments must be
founded on current market valuations rather than cost, as would, indeed, be required
under the Investment Company Act [§ 2(a)391" Second supplemental memorandum
of the SEC as Intervenor, p. 6, n. 9, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad
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Even aside from this mitigating factor, however, it seems that the
need for ICC regulation is satisfied by certain provisions in the In-
vestment Company Act that were drafted to check disproportionate debt
financing and capital inflation. First, in order to assure an equity cap-
ital sufficient to cushion all fixed payment obligations,47 section i8(a)
of the act prohibits registered dosed-end investment companies from
selling their bonds or preferred stock unless immediately after such
issuance or sale there will be an asset coverage of at least 300 or 2oo
per cent respectively.48 Also, in order to prevent dilution of the com-
mon stockholders' equity,49 section 23(a) provides that such companies
Company Merger, etc. 295 I.C.C. ix (1955). In response to Alleghany's representa-
tions as to its prospective emphasis on railroad securities, the SEC took the position
that, "So long as these security holdings are too small to involve control, or are
placed in trust so as to isolate them from control by Alleghany, they are clearly being
held as investments, and as to such holdings Alleghany would remain in the position
of an investment company, not that of a carrier." Id. at xo. Of interest in con.
nection with Alleghany's "prospective portfolio," is the announcement by its directors,
on May 1, 1956, that the Corporation plans to invest $2o,ooo,ooo in the securities
of Webb & Knapp, Inc., a realty organization. Standard & Poor's, Daily News Sec.
tion, May 7, 1956, p. 8577.
'" "[Tlhe amount paid in for the equity securities constitutes a cushion for the
senior securities in the sense that the company can sustain a loss in assets equivalent
to that amount without impairing the liquidation values of the senior securities. This
margin of insulation from loss is the chief virtue claimed for the senior securities."
SEC REPORT pt. 3, c. V, at 1665. The SEC REPORT cites several instances of inade-
quate "junior" money. Id. at 1666-68.
,8 54 STAT. 817 (1940), s5 U.S.C. § Soa-8(a) (i952). Section s8(e) of the
statute, however, exempts from these restrictions "any senior securities issued or sold by
any registered closed-end company . . . (2) for the purpose of refunding through pay-
ment, purchase, redemption, retirement or exchange, any senior security of such reg-
istered investment company. . . ." There is a possibility that this exemption might
exclude from the requirements of the act the issuance of Alleghany's new preferred
stock, since that issue was made pursuant to an offer for the exchange of the 6%
cumulative convertible preferred for the $5.50 cumulative preferred. See note 18
supra. The SEC believes, however, that, because of the convertible feature, the new
preferred stock was in the nature of a warrant. Such an interpretation would not only
exclude the exchange offer from the § 18(e) exemption it would also render it illegal
under § s8(d), which provides that investment companies may not issue warrants to
purchase their securities unless the warrants must expire within s2o days. Interviews
with staff members of the office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Cf. § 25 of the statute, which gives the SEC certain supervisory powers
over all reorganization plans with respect to registered investment companies. 54.
STAT. 826 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § Soa-25 (1952).
Section s8(a) furthermore provides that every issue of bonds or preferred stock
must contain a clause prohibiting the declaration of dividends on any stock unless there
will be, immediately after the payment of the dividends, an asset coverage of 300% or
200% respectively.
"9 See Note, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 283 (1941). Also directed to the "dilu-
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may issue securities only for cash or other securities, except in connection
with a reorganization or a stock dividend; and section 23(b), with cer-
tain exceptions, prohibits the issuance of common stock at a price below
the current net asset value. °
The contrast between the definitive nature of these tests and the
vagueness of the standard under the Interstate Commerce Act 1 suggests
a difference between the problem of unsound capitalization as it relates
to investment companies which control carriers and as it relates to the
operating carriers themselves. In this latter area, the ICC has, in large
part, been concerned with determining what assets are capitalizable5 2
and how they should be valued.53 For example, operating companies
may seek authority to issue securities for the purpose of financing new
construction and improvements," or to capitalize expenditures already
made for those purposes.5 These are not the type of problems that
will normally arise in the case of an investment company, however."
and it is therefore understandable that the emphasis of sections 18 and
23 of the Investment Company Act is quite different. These sections
wrere especially designed to insure the financial well-being of companies
tion" problem is § i8(d), which proscribes the issuance of warrants which will not
expire within 12o days. See note 48 supra.
o 54 STAT. 825 (1940), IS U.S.C. § 8oa-23 (1952).
" For the standards prescribed by § 5(3) for § zoa regulation, see note 39 supra.
Section zoa itself provides merely that the Commission shall approve issuances of se-
curities and assumptions of liability "only if it finds that such issue or assumption: (a)
is for some lawful object within [the carrier's] corporate purposes, and compatible
with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the
proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and
which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably neces-
sary and appropriate for such purpose." 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § zoa(z) (1952). The amplification of these standards is left to the admin-
istrative process. See references cited in note 41 supra.
2 See LoCKLIN, Capitalizable Assets, op. cit. supra note 41 c. V; 3 A SHARFMAN,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 5o8-Ix. For a collection of ICC cases on this point, see
Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated, § zoa(z), nn. 25-41. A closely related matter,
which has frequently occupied the Commission's attention, is whether to allow the capi-
talization of earned surplus by stock dividends. See LOCKLIN, supra c. XIII 3 A
SHARFMAN, supra at 513-26; Trona Ry. Co. Stock, 275 I.C.C. 6xo (195o) (authority
to declare preferred stock dividend denied)5 Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated,
§ 2oa (z), n. 113.
"1 See LOCKLIN, Valuation for Purposes of Capitalization, op. cit. supra note 41,
c. V15 3 A SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 511-13.
"4 E.g., Brimstone R. Co. Stock, z5z I.C.C. 91 (942).
"E.g., New Orleans G. N. Ry. Co. Bonds, 254 I.C.C. 794 (1944).
"6 See Jaretzki, supra ,iote 6, at 328 (194).
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like Alleghany; 5 7 and if, under the administration of the SEC, they ac-
complish that end, then it is quite unlikely that the purposes of the In-
terstate Commerce Act will be frustrated.
Closely related to this problem of securing financial stability is the
problem of maintaining a proper relationship between capital invest-
ment and corporate control. This is undoubtedly a matter of some
concern to the ICC, as it has been recognized that too wide a divergence
between ownership and control in the transportation industry can be
detrimental to the public interest in several respects."' The mischief
with which the ICC is concerned in this connection, however, seems quite
overshadowed by the abuses to which certain provisions of the Invest-
ment Company Act are directed.5 The Report of the SEC which led
to the passage of that act revealed that complex capital structures
frequently enabled investment company sponsors to acquire complete
control with a disproportionately small investment.0° Typically, the
major capital contributions would be made by the nonvoting senior
security holders, while the sponsors would take a majority of the
voting common stock. 6 This development naturally resulted in a
leverage position62 almost certain to invite speculative management 63
"' In addition to the provisions of § 18(a) (see note 48 supra), § 19 prohibits the
payment of dividends out of capital or capital gains unless the source of the dividends is
disclosed. See Jaretzki, supra note 6, at 335-38 (194) 5 Note, 88 U. PA. L. REV.
584, 596 (1940).
" See 3A SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 534-42. In speaking of the separa-
tion between ownership and control, Professor Sharfman says the ICC has realized
"that developments of this character in the field of railroad finance may jeopardize
the credit of the carriers and impair the transportation service." Id. at 534.
"' See FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRusTs GONE WRONG 33-51 (1931); Comment, 50
YALE L. J. 440, 449-51 (1947) 5 Notes, 4! COLUM. L. REV. 270, 273 (194), 88
U. PA. L. REV. 584, 590-600 (1940).
" "[T]he complex capital structure company is a suitable vehicle for promoters who
desire by a small proportionate investment to achieve immediate and prospective control
of the company and at the same time receive an inordinate participation in prospective
profits." SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. V, at 1597. See Id. Appendix I, at 1937-40, for tables
showing the proportion of total capital of four investment companies contributed by
senior and junior security holders, and the sponsors' interest therein.
0' The SEC REPORT cited specific instances in which control was concentrated by
the use of debentures or preferred stock, Id. at 1598-62o5 and instances in which
control was concentrated by the use of Class B, nonvoting common stock, Id. at
1620-41.
'2 See Jaretzki, supra note 6, at 3o6. "The larger the amobnt of senior securities
issued relative to the funds contributed by common stockholders the greater the possible
gain to common stockholders--and, of course, the greater the risk that the entire junior
money may be wiped out, at least temporarily." SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. V at 1582.
63 "The senior-equity set-up creates such a disparity between the possible profits to
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and, furthermore, it fadlitated transfer of control in times of declining
profits.64 Such practices would clearly have adverse effects on the trans-
portation industry if they were allowed to prevail among railroad hold-
ing companies.Y Consequently, since the express provisions of the In-
vestment Company Act offer the more stringent safeguards,00 it appears
that the public interest would best be served by SEC regulation of this
particular problem.
SEC Regulatory Interests:
In addition to these few areas in which the ICC and the SEC
have a similar concern in the regulation of investment companies, there
are many others in which the problems to be met are distinctively within
the compass of the Investment Company Act. By holding out to the
general public the promise of diversified investment risk and expert
the sponsor from a speculative policy and the possible losses to the sponsor therefrom
as to make the temptation to pursue such a policy almost irresistible to the sponsor."
SEC REPORT pt. 3, c. V at 167o. The SEC REPORT cites, as a case in point, the
speculative activities of the United States & International Securities Corporation, which
was formed by Dillon, Read & Co. on a 5 to x leverage basis. Id. at 1673-74.
"See, generally, SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. V, at 1641-64, for specific examples of
"trafficking in investment companies." "[T]he management of the company may be
passed on without the consent of the investors who have contributed the bulk of the
funds. The Study has demonstrated that comparatively rarely does the purchaser of
control from a previous sponsor seek control for the purpose of strengthening the
position of the investor in the company."
"See note 58 supra.
" Most of these safeguards are provided by § 18 of the act. 54 STAT. 8z7 (940),
15 U.S.C. §8oa-x8 (1952). Section 18(a)(i)(c)(i) requires that each issue of
bonds contain a clause to the effect that if the asset coverage of such bonds drops
below oo%, the bondholders, voting as a class, shall be entitled to elect at least a
majority of the members of the board of directors; and § is (a)(z)(c) requires that
each issue of preferred stock entitle the holders, voting as a class, to elect at least two
directors at all times, and, subject to the rights of bondholders, to elect a majority
of directors if dividends are unpaid on the preferred stock for two years. Section
1 8(c) provides that investment companies may not issue more than three classes of
securities-one class of bonds, one class of preferred stock, and one class of common
stock. And, finally, § 18(i) provides that every share of stock issued by a registered
management company shall be a voting stock and shall have equal voting rights with
every other outstanding voting stock. In addition, § 2o(a) subjects proxy solicitations
by investment companies to the regulation to which solicitations relating to listed
securities are already subject by reason of SEC regulations under § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 895 (1934)
, 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1952). And, finally, § 16a is designed to prevent secret shifts in control by ser;atlm
resignations of directors. See Tolins, supra note 6, at 93-94; Notes, 41 COLU . L.
REV. 269, 281-82 (1941), 88 U. PA. L. REv. 584, 607-1o (1940).
"7 See especially, Barnard, Jackson, & Motley, supra note 6.
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management, 8 investment companies accumulate unusually large pools
of liquid assets, 69 which are naturally susceptible of a variety of uses by
the management or the controlling stockholders." In connection with
the Alleghany controversy, it is perhaps significant to note that the
SEC Report disclosed several instances in which an investment com-
pany was used as a device to acquire control of a company or group
of companies.7 ' Such an undertaking, of course, is not improper so
long as it does not disappoint the reasonable investment expectations of
the company's security holders. It does seem, however, that this latter
contingency could be avoided only by the prophylactic measures of
the Investment Company Act. For example, if the acquisition of con-
trol will constitute a fundamental shift in the company's investment
policies, as stated in its registration statement, then section 13(a) of the
act will require the approval of a majority of the company's outstanding
voting securities.7" Moreover, the acquisition of control by the Alle-
ghany Corporation was accompanied by certain "upstream loans"" and
"8 "The underlying principles of investment trusts were the combination of funds by
many small investors to lessen investment risks by diversification of investment, and the
maintenance of specialized management at a moderate cost." Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practicers, S. REP. No. 1455, 7 3 d Cong., 2d
Sess. 333 (I934). See also SEC REPORT Pt. 4, c. II, at 373-75-
"' See Jaretzki, supra note 6, at 304-05, where it is observed that the significance
of an investment company attaches not to the "pooling of funds," which occurs in the
case of any corporation, but rather to "the use to which these funds are put."
o "The liquidity of their capital assets made more easy their embezzlement or theft
or their use for improper purposes." Id. at 307. See also SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. II, at
1-31; Notes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 584, 6o6 (t940), 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272
('94').
""A strong incentive for the formation of investment companies existed in the
case of sponsors who were desirous of acquiring or perpetuating influence or control
over industrial or financial enterprises." SEC REPORT pt. i, c. III, at 89. The Central-
Illinois Securities Corporation, for one example, together with H. M. Byllesby & Co.,
arranged to purchase control of a utility holding company. The venture resulted in a
loss of $1,730,691. SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. II, at 169-74.
" "No registered investment company shall, unless authorized by the vote of a ma-
jority of its outstanding voting securities . . . (3) deviate from its policy in respect
of concentration of investments in any particular industry or group of industries as
recited in its registration statement, or deviate from any fundamental policy recited in
its registration statement pursuant to section 8(b) (2) 5 or (4) change the nature of its
business so as to cease to be an investment company." 54 STAT. 811 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § Soa-i3 (1952).
" In connection with the New York Central proxy contest (see note 2 supra),
Alleghany expended approximately $1,078,000, which is stated to "have been made on
behalf of others, and it is anticipated that the Corporation will be reimbursed for the
same in 1954." To the extent that this expenditure represents an advance or loan to
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"transactions with affiliated persons "74 and the act specifically regulates
such dealings in order to assure that those in control do not take ad-
vantage of a conveniently available fund for their own personal aggran-
dizement.75
The dangers of unregulated investment company activity, however,
are much more extensive than those which might be illustrated by the
Alleghany history.70 Affiliations with securities brokers or investment
or on behalf of controlling persons of Alleghany, it was an "upstream loan." Memo-
randum of the SEC as Intervenor, pp. 8-9, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Rail-
road Co. Merger, etc. z95 I.C.C. i (1955).
71 In July 1954, Clint Murchison and Sid Richardson sold New York Central stock
to Alleghany, and, in connection with this sale, entered into joint venture agreements
with Alleghany under which they each borrowed from the company the sum of
$3,750,000. Both men are directors of the New York Central and, therefore, are
"affiliated persons" of IDS by virtue of its ownership of approximately 2o% of the
voting securities of IDS; and IDS is, in turn, controlled by Alleghany. Id. at 8. See
also How Young Got the Votes, Fortune, Aug. 1954, p. 87.
"As for "upstream loans," § z provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any
registered management company to lend money or property to any person, directly or
indirectly, if . . . (b) such person controls or is under common control with such
registered company. . . ." 54 STAT. 82z (940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-zx (1952). "Con-
trol" is defined by section 2(a) (9). 54 STAT. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-z(a) (9)
(950).
"Transactions with affiliated persons" are covered by § 17(a), which makes it
unlawful for persons who are officers, directors, promoters, or persons affiliated with such
persons knowingly to sell to or purchase from their investment company any securities
or property, or borrow from such investment company. But § 17 (b) provides that
the SEC may grant exemptions from subsection (a) if the transaction is fair and is
consistent with the investment policies of the act. 54 STAT. 8x5 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 8oa-I7 (1952). See the Atlantic Coast Line Co., 13 S.E.C. 719 (1943). The self-
dealing practices to which this section was directed were among the foremost abuses
which the SEC Report uncovered: "While the losses in a number of investment com-
panies were attributable principally to the security market decline and general business
decline, in many cases the substantial losses sustained by investment companies were
the result of the numerous transactions which the sponsors, managers, officers, directors,
and other controlling interests effected for their own account with the investment com-
panies which they dominated." SEC REPORT Pt. 3, c. I, at 22. See Jaretzki, supra
note 6, at 317-24; Note, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 288-91 (941).
"The SEC memorandum submitted to the ICC on Sept. 14, 1954, cited several
other transactions which would have been subject to regulation under the Investment
Company Act. The last of Alleghany's interest in the C & 0 Ry. Co. was sold to
Cyrus L. Eaton on January i8, 1954. Since Mr. Eaton was affiliated with the
Portsmouth Steel Corporation, 18% of whose voting securities were owned by Alle-
ghany, this was a transaction with an "affiliated person" of an "affiliated person" within
the meaning of § 17(a). Memorandum of the SEC as Intervenor, p. 7, Louisville
& Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc. 295 I.C.C. 11 (x955). On
January 20, 195o, Robert R. Young and Allan P. Kirby, directors of Alleghany, ex-
changed with the company their shares of Alleghany's preferred stock, on which there
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bankers,77 for example, open unusual opportunities for market support
operations 7' and for the dumping of "sticky" issues.79  It is quite ap-
parent that these and other practices"0 with which the Investment Com-
pany Act is concerned must be regulated for the protection of the public
investor, regardless of any incidental relationship which an investment
company may acquire with the transportation industry.
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
In view, therefore, of their respective interests in the regulation
of investment companies that control railroads, there would appear to
be no doubt as to which commission's jurisdiction it is most essential
to preserve. It would be at least improvident to sacrifice the intensive
were arrearages of $xo3 per share, for common stock in IDS. Section 17(a) (2) would
have applied to this exchange. Id. at 13. In 1949, Alleghany purchased over 91%
of the outstanding voting stock of IDS, in violation of § i2(d), which provides that
"it shall be unlawful for any registered investment company . . . to purchase or
otherwise acquire .. .any security issued by. .. (i) any other investment company...."
Id. at 14. The evils of pyramiding, to which this section is directed, were examined
extensively in the SEC REPORT pt. 3, c. VII, at 2721-95. See also Jaretzki, supra
note 6, at 325-26.
" In order to insure an independent board of directors, § xo(a) of the act provides
that no more than 60% thereof may consist of investment advisers to the company;
and § xo(b) provides that a majority of the board must be composed of persons who
are not regular brokers for the company or principal underwriters of its securities,
or investment bankers. 54 STAT. 8o6 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §8oa-xo (1952). Also,
§ xo(f) prohibits investment companies from purchasing securities underwritten by
persons affiliated with the investment company, unless the investment company itself
is a principal underwriter of such securities, until after the termination of the under-
writing syndicate. 54 STAT. 8o6 (1940), .5 U.S.C. § Soa-io(f) (195z).
78 The SEC REPORT disclosed, for example, that, following the market crash of
October, 1929, the funds of the Chatham Phenix Allied Corporation were utilized to
support the market price of the stock of Chatham Phenix National Bank & Trust Com-
pany. From these operations the company sustained a net loss of $88,073.93. SEC
REPORT Pt. 3, c. II, at 131.
70 See 88 U. PA. L. REV. 584, 593 (1940) ; SEC REPORT pt. 3, c. II, at 527-66.
"'For example, § 12(a) of the act makes it unlawful for investment companies, in
contravention of SEC rules, to trade on margin, participate in joint trading accounts,
or sell short. 54 STAT. 8o8 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-iz(a). But see Jaretzki, supra
note 6, at 324. Also, § 12(f) provides that an investment company may not purchase
securities issued by another investment company if, as a result of such purchase, the
company will have more than 3% of the outstanding voting securities of the other
investment company. See note 76 supra. Finally, § 15 of the act prescribes certain
requirements for the investment advisory and underwriting contracts of investment com-
panies, 54 STAT. 812 (i94o), i5 U.S.C. §8oa-i5 (1952); and §§22 and 23 deal
with the distribution and repurchase or redemption of securities of investment com-
panies. 54 STAT. 823, 825 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8oa-22, 8oa-23 (1952). See, gen-
erally, Jaretzki, supra note 6, at 327-32.
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supervision of investment companies afforded by the Investment Com-
pany Act for whatever minor advantages are to be anticipated from the
ICC's special competence in railroad matters. But because of the sec-
tion 3(c)(9) exclusion, SEC regulation of Alleghany is possible only
when the ICC does not assert its own jurisdiction.
Cession of Jurisdiction by the ICC:
In this connection, it is relevant to consider the SEC's contention
that the ICC, in its discretion, has the authority not to subject a railroad
holding company to its jurisdiction.8' In rejecting this contention, the
ICC took the position that it could not avoid asserting general juris-
diction over Alleghany without ignoring the mandate of section 5(3), 8'
The language of that section, however, would certainly indicate that
the ICC has discretion in the matter; s3 and, in addition, the ICC made
no attempt to reconcile its position with several of its past decisions
under section 50), in which it declined to assert jurisdiction over a
noncarrier whose control of a carrier was only incidental to its principal
business activity. 4 Against this background of decisions, the ICC's
"lMemorandum of the SEC as Intervenor, p. x8; second supplemental memo-
randum of the SEC as Intervenor, pp. x-5, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Rail-
road Co. Merger, etc., 295 I.C.C. 11 (1955).
". "Except that we have the power to impose just and reasonable conditions, we are
bound to apply the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in the manner we consider
best protects the interests of the public in the field of transportation in interstate
commerce. We have no discretionary power to yield our jurisdiction to any statutory
agency." Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Co. Merger, etc., I.C.C.
Finance Docket No. 18656, Report of Division 4, Sheet 16 (1955). The full Com-
mission was in accord with the view of Division 4. "As the division stated, we believe
that unless Congress amends either or both of the statutes involved herein, the results
which S.E.C. desires to achieve are not within our powers under the Interstate Com-
merce Act." 295 I.C.C. i1, 14 (x955).
8348 STAT. 217 0933)
, 
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(3) (195z). The section
provides that whenever a noncarrier, as authorized under § 5(2), acquires control
of two or more carriers, it "shall, to the extent provided by the Commission in such
order, be considered as a carrier subject to such of the following provisions as are
applicable. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
8See, for example, Valdosta So. R.R. Purchase, etc., 282 I.C.C. 705 (1952);
Rockdale, Sandow & Southern R.R. Co. Operation and Control, z8z I.C.C. 297
(952); Arkansas & L.M. Ry. Co., 282 I.C.C. 254 (1952); Cambria & I.R. Co.
Control, 275 I.C.C. 254 (i95o); Saginaw Dock & Terminal Co. Contract Carrier
Application, 26o I.C.C. 657 (1945); Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. Control, 252 I.C.C.
683 (1942); Warrer & Gulf Nay. Co. Control, zso I.C.C. z6 (1941). In fact, the
Commission summarized its position with respect to the administration of § 5(3) in
the case of Shaver Forwarding Co. Purchase, etc., 26o I.C.C. 479, 495 (1945): "In
the administration of the provisions of § 5(3) of the act, we have given consideration in
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position appears insupportable.85
Conclusion:
Assuming, then, that the ICC has the power to decline jurisdiction
over Alleghany, a fairly satisfactory resolution of the conflict between
the two commissions is possible. As has been demonstrated, SEC regu-
lation of Alleghany under the Investment Company Act can be ex-
pected substantially to accommodate the regulatory interests of the ICC.
It is a more open question, however, whether the ICC's regulatory in-
terests would be as well represented in the case of an investment com-
pany whose portfolio, unlike Alleghany's, consisted predominantly of
railroad securities. In such a situation, it is more than likely that the
ICC's special competence in railroad financing would be, in some re-
spects, quite useful, if not essential. Even so, since dual regulation is
impossible, a choice between the commissions would still be necessary.
In such a case, though, either choice would obviously be a compromise;
and the optimum regulation could only be achieved through the com-
bined efforts of the two commissions, each deferring to the other accord-
ing to its respective competence.
If this is so, then perhaps congressional re-examination of section
3(c) (9) of the Investment Company Act, as it affects railroad holding
companies, is timely. There is already some evidence that its applica-
tion to such companies was not intended by its sponsorssO and a stat-
appropriate cases to the primary business or interests of the non-carrier person therein
authorized to acquire control of a carrier, or of two or more carriers. Thus, we have
exercised our plenary jurisdiction in the premises where the primary interest of the
non-carrier is transportation [citing cases], but where such primary interest is not
transportation, but the production of steel [citing cases], or the production of lumber
[citing cases], we concluded that it was unnecessary to include in our orders any
provisions subjecting the non-carriers to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act
in respect of reports, accounts, and so forth, or carriers, or of the issue of securities. .. ."
Admittedly, these cases are not authority for the wisdom of the ICC's cession of juris-
diction in the Alleghany matter; but they would appear to be persuasive of the propo-
sition that the Commission does have the power not to assert its jurisdiction.
"' This was also the conclusion reached by the district court. 134 F. Supp. 132, 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"The legislative history of § 3(c)(9) strongly suggests that it was included in
the Investment Company Act without any thought of avoiding dual regulation of
railroad holding companies, but rather to preclude dual regulation of railroad sub-
sidiaries. When originally introduced into the Senate as S. 358o, the Investment Com-
pany Act contained no counterpart to the present § 3 (c) 9. At the hearings on the bill,
R. V. Fletcher, General Counsel of the Association of American Railroads, pointed out
that passage of the Transportation Act of 1940, then pending, would have the effect
of subjecting railroad subsidiaries and affliates to ICC jurisdiction with respect to the
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utory scheme which would allow dual regulation in appropriate situa-
tions seems quite desirable. However, the dual regulation permitted by
such an amendment would necessarily require a large measure of
cooperation between the two commissions-more, perhaps, than realistic-
ally can be expected in the light of the controversy precipitated by the
Alleghany controversy.
issuance and sale of securities and the filing of reports. Mr. Fletcher feared that certain
of these subsidiaries, however, might also be held to come within the definition of an
investment company; and he urged the committee to pass an exemption which would
avoid dual regulation. His dosing remarks were as follows: "A careful examination
of S. 3580 rather indicates that perhaps the bill was not intended to cover railroads
and their subsidiaries. Certainly these subsidiaries are not investment companies in
the ordinary sense of the word. However, there is language in section 3 of S. 3580,
as well as in section 6, dealing with exemptions, which leaves the matter in doubt.
In order that all doubt may be removed, the Association of American Railroads is
suggesting that S. 358o be amended. . . ." [Emphasis added.] Significantly, Mr.
Fletcher made no reference to companies controlling carriers, but was concerned only
with subsidiaries. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 3 d Sess. pt. 2, at 777-78 (x93). A subsequent
exchange between Representative Cole and David Schenker at the hearings on H.R.
oo65, an amended version of S. 3580, indicate that § 3(c) (9) was actually drafted
in the light of the effect on railroad subsidiaries of the Transportation Act of 1940.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. 103 (1939). See The Atlantic Coast Line Co., 9
S.E.C. 68o (94).
